In the case of X. v. Finland (Applicatioin no. 34806/04) the ECtHR found - among others - the violation of Article 8 of the ECHR in relation with the applicant's forced medication in a mental hospital which was based on a law lacking proper safeguards against arbitrariness.
In its judgment the Court reiterated that a medical intervention in defiance of the subject’s will gives rise to an interference with respect for his or her private life, in particular his or her right to physical integrity. Such an interference would constitute a breach of Article 8 of the ECHR, unless it was in accordance with the law, pursued a legitimate aim or aims under paragraph 2 of Article 8, and was necessary in a democratic society. In this respect, the notion of necessity implies that the interference corresponds to a pressing social need and, in particular, that it is proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued. In determining whether an interference was “necessary in a democratic society” a
margin of appreciation that is left to the states shall be taken into account.
The Court noted that it had not been disputed by the Finnish government that the forced administration of medication constituted an interference with the applicant’s right to respect for her physical integrity. It thus remained to be determined whether the interference was justified under tparagraph 2 of Article 8. The Court stated that the expression “in accordance with the law”, within the meaning of Article 8
requires firstly that the impugned measure should have some basis in domestic law; it also refers to the quality of the law in question, requiring that it should be accessible to the person concerned, who must moreover be able to foresee its consequences for him, and compatible with the rule of law (see e.g. Herczegfalvy v. Austria, 24 September 1992, § 88, Series A no. 244).
As to the legal basis in Finnish law, the Court reiterated that in accordance with the case-law of the Convention institutions the term “law” is to be understood in its “substantive” sense, not its “formal” one:
In a sphere covered by written law, the “law” is the enactment in force as the competent courts have interpreted it (see, inter alia, Société Colas Est and Others v. France, no. 37971/97, § 43, ECHR 2002-III).
In this respect, the Court found that its power to review compliance with domestic law was limited, it was the national authorities to interpret and apply that law in the first place. After the examination of the relevant law the Court was satisfied that the interference complained of had had a legal basis in Finnish law.
As to the quality of the law, the Court noted that the requirements of the accessibility and the foreseeability of the law did not raise any problems in the current case. However, the Court reiterated that paragraph 2 of Article 8 also requires the law in question to be “compatible with the rule of law”.
In the context of forced administration of medication, the domestic law must provide some protection to the individual against arbitrary interference with his or her rights under Article 8. The Court must thus examine the “quality” of the legal rules applicable to the applicant in the instant case.
The Court noted in the first place that the relevant section of the Finnich Mental Health Act contained detailed provisions on the treatment of mental illness, and in particular, that it is for the physician attending to the patient to decide on the treatment to be given, regardless of the patient’s will. A care order issued for an involuntary hospitalisation of a psychiatric patient is understood to contain also an automatic authorisation to treat the patient, even against his or her will. There is no obligation for doctors to have the patient's consent in written form or to seek such a consent from the patient’s relatives or guardian/trustee. The law allows forced administration of medication in case the patient refuses to give his or her consent or withdraws previous consent. The decisions taken by the treating doctor concerning medication of a patient are not subject to appeal.
The Court considered that forced administration of medication represented a serious interference with a person’s physical integrity and must accordingly be based on a “law” that guarantees proper safeguards against arbitrariness.
In the present case such safeguards were missing. The decision to confine the applicant to involuntary treatment included an automatic authorisation to proceed to forced administration of medication when the applicant refused the treatment. The decision-making was solely in the hands of the treating doctors who could take even quite radical measures regardless of the applicant’s will. Moreover, their decision-making was free from any kind of immediate judicial scrutiny: the applicant did not have any remedy available whereby she could require a court to rule on the lawfulness, including proportionality, of the forced administration of medication and to have it discontinued.
On these grounds the Court found that the forced administration of medication in the present case was implemented without proper legal safeguards. The Court concluded that, even if there could be said to be a general legal basis for the measures provided for in Finnish law, the absence of sufficient safeguards against forced medication by the treating doctors deprived the applicant of the minimum degree of protection to which she was entitled under the rule of law in a democratic society. The interference in question was “in accordance with the law” as required by paragraph 2 of Article 8 of the ECHR, therefore there had been a violation of Article 8 of the ECHR.
No comments:
Post a Comment